A short history of the employees’ unions in Bombay, 1947–1991 by Hensman, Rohini & Banaji, Jairus
1 
 
 
 
A short history of the employees’ unions in Bombay, 1947–1991 
 
Employees‟ unions emerged in the late forties and fifties as a new and increasingly dominant 
form of union organisation among large companies in Bombay. By “employees‟ unions”  we 
mean unions which have the words „Employees' Union‟ or „Workers' Union‟ or „Staff and 
Workers' Union‟ in their name, regardless of whether they retain an outsider as their President. 
The counterpoint to such unions are the much larger general labour or mass unions which attract 
workers from a host of companies within or across industries. Till the mid fifties, by far the best 
established union of this type (henceforth „external union‟ )  was the AITUC. The fragmentation 
of the labour movement which began in the fifties with employers encouraging the expansion of 
INTUC as a counterpoise to the AITUC continued unabated over the following decades. The 
growth of outside unions exacerbated union r ival r ies  and partly eroded the base of the 
employees‟ unions. 
We shall argue in this paper that the history of employees‟ unionism in the Bombay region has 
to a large extent been dominated by an endemic hostility to independent unionism among 
managements in the area. By „independent unionism‟ is meant the sector represented by the 
stronger employees‟ unions and their federations, where these exist. But „endemic hostility‟ has 
reflected itself in three very different styles: (1)  Companies that accept employees‟ unions but 
litigate fiercely over demands; (2)  companies that pursue strategies designed to break the power 
of a strong internal union or union federation; and (3) companies or business groups which have 
never been willing to deal with unions they cannot control. These styles represent different 
degrees of hostility, of course. In particular, attempts to undermine the power of internal unions 
became a constant feature of the eighties. 
Formative period 
Bombay‟s industrial structure in the forties and fifties was dominated by the subsidiaries of 
international companies. Lever Brothers and Crompton Parkinson had established manufacturing 
facilities by the late thirties, Firestone started manufacturing in 1940, Boots around 1946, and 
May & Baker in 1949. British Oxygen, ICI, Burroughs Wellcome, and Colgate were also in 
production before the fifties. Glaxo moved from packing to full-scale manufacturing in 1949, 
and by the mid fifties oil-refining and pharmaceuticals had seen major foreign investments, with 
Dumex, Parke-Davis, Ciba, Burmah-Shell, and Standard Vacuum commissioning plants between 
1952 and 1955. The crucial point to note is that the emergence of employees‟ unionism reflected 
the evolution of a global industrial culture in a region previously dominated by Indian business. 
Of eleven employees‟ unions in existence by 1948, ten belonged to companies controlled by 
overseas firms – Lever Bros., ICI, Ford, Goodlass Wall, Greaves Cotton, Volkart, Firestone, 
East Asiatic, and Indian Oxygen. The sole exception was Tata Oil Mills Employees‟ Union that 
started in 1946 in a factory established in 1938. This dominance of foreign companies in the 
history of employees‟ unionism was then reinforced in the fifties and sixties. Among the larger 
companies, most of the employees‟ unions formed in that period were in the foreign concerns. 
Having said this, however, it is less easy to decide whether employees‟ unions were popular 
because companies preferred them or whether more complex forces were
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at work, notably, the level of education and self-confidence of employees, especially white-collar 
groups within those companies. At any rate,  it is incontestable that staff played a key role in the 
formation of employees‟ unions in the period from 1946 to 1951. 
 
Staff played the leading role in forming the Greaves Cotton & Allied Companies‟ Employees‟ 
Union in 1946, at a time when Crompton Parkinson Works (in the same group) had an external 
union led by Vitthal Chaudhary. Management opposition to the Greaves Cotton & Allied 
Companies‟ Employees‟ Union became most intense when the amalgamation of Greaves Cotton 
and Crompton Parkinson in 1966 gave the employes‟ union a foothold in the Kanjur factory. The 
Tata Oil Mills Employees‟ Union started as a staff union in 1946, but in 1950 daily-rated 
workmen joined the union, dissatisfied with the Socialist-run Chemical Mazdoor Sabha. In the 
mid sixties this employees‟ union would become part of a company-based federation of twenty-
seven unions throughout the country. In Ford Motor Co., on 22 November 1946, the employees 
of the company decided to form the Ford Motors Staff Union, which suggests that the union was 
formed by the white-collar group. The Volkart Employees‟ Union was formed in July 1947 by 
clerical staff at the Head Office at Ballard Pier. „At that time Communists were taking over 
unions. To keep away the Communists, management promoted an internal union.‟ However, 
leadership of this union passed into the hands of a more radical group which included 
K.G.Shenoy at the Head Office. The remarkable feature about the Volkart Employees‟ Unions 
throughout India was the speed with which they built up the All-India Voltas & Volkart 
Employees‟ Federation in the course of the fifties. Formed in 1959, the Federation secured 
recognition in 1960. The East Asiatic & Dumex Employees‟ Union, which partly evolved into 
the Pfizer Employees‟ Union in 1962, started as the East Asiatic Co. (India) Ltd., Bombay Staff 
Union, in October 1948. This union functioned out of „Shramjeevi Awaz‟ at Sewri, the office of 
the Petroleum Workers‟ Union. East Asiatic, a Danish company, sold Dumex to Pfizer 
Corporation in 1958. When Pfizer refused to deal with the East Asiatic & Dumex Employees‟ 
Union, it became necessary to form the Pfizer Employees‟ Union. The Petroleum Workers‟ 
Union was led by G.Sundaram. who was fired from Caltex for union activity and became an 
important link between the employees‟ unions and the strongly secular, left-wing culture of the 
Communist Party. „We used to sit in Sundaram‟s office, there was so much activity at that time, 
so much discussion! …Sundaram was the greatest help! If not for them, we would not have been 
able to learn anything, we were very new‟. The Glaxo Laboratories Employees‟ Union was 
started in 1950, again by the staff. As an example of the maturity of these early unions, in the 
l i t igat ion  on its first Charter, settled by an Award in 1952, the Glaxo union used the services 
of the Labour Research Department in London to secure information on the parent company. The 
Larsen & Toubro and Allied Companies‟ Staff Union was certainly in existence by 1950, and 
also covered daily-rated workmen. The company‟s activities were scattered across Bombay but 
on the verge of being centralised at Powai, which was described as an „undeveloped jungle to 
which there is no regular transport‟. Finally, the Kamani Employees‟ Union started as a staff 
union called National Employees‟ Union, in 1951. 
The dominance of staff leaderships is thus a specially striking feature of the earliest phase, but 
by the sixties a more complex pattern had emerged. On the one hand, the external unions began 
to make systematic inroads into a base represented by the employees‟ unions, fragmenting the 
solidarity of the labour movement, and on the other hand, in some factories workers formed 
their own internal unions. Thus Siemens Workers Union was formed in 1964, in juxtaposition to 
the existing Siemens Engineering & Manufacturing Employees‟ Uniom, and in 1968 the Philips
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factory at Kalwa decided to separate from the staff union and form the Philips Workers Union. 
These separations were prompted by relocation. The general point that emerges is that the 
stability of employees‟ unions depended on their abi l i ty to secure parity in conditions of 
service between staff and workers. Where unions succeeded in this, they remained united, 
elsewhere problems would emerge. It is surely remarkable that the employees‟ unionism of the 
late fifties and early sixties tried to break down disparities in service conditions by struggling for 
extension of staff conditions to workers. In litigation of the early sixties the Parke-Davis 
Employees‟ Union argued, „There is serious discrimination between the administrative office and 
the factory‟. Similarly, the Voltas & Volkart Employees‟ Union argued, „there is a great disparity 
between the scales of factory staff and the office staff. The disparity between the white-collar 
worker and the factory worker is not in keeping with the times and should be eliminated‟. In 
another case, adjudicated in 1960, the Dumex Employees‟ Union  pointed out, „...in this 
company there is great disparity of income between officers and workmen...officers are paid a 
car allowance, house rent allowance, entertainment expenses, etc.‟ Judges either were or were 
not inclined to accept these arguments; one judge who did, Justice P.D.Sawarkar, removed the 
distinction between staff and workers‟ dearness allowance, prescribing a „uniform rate of D.A.‟ 
in the case of Greaves Cotton.  K.T.Sule, who fought this case for the union, pointed out that „in 
Voltas, Lever Bros, Dumex…there was no distinction in the rate of dearness allowance paid to 
monthly rated and daily rated workmen‟. Sawarkar‟s landmark judgement had some impact on 
collective bargaining, for example, the slab system was extended to daily-rated workers in Tata 
Oil Mills by an agreement dated 1971. 
Burmah-Shell, Stanvac, Firestone, ICI, Indian Oxygen, May & Baker, and Carbide Chemicals 
were among the world‟s largest corporations, or subsidiaries of such corporations, yet they 
litigated tenaciously, accepting the unions but resisting union demands every inch of the way. 
Collective bargaining was thus established through the sheer tenacity of the unions in the face of 
considerable resistance from the „large and prosperous‟ concerns. For example, the Imperial 
Chemical Industries Employees‟ Union presented its first charter in 1946 and an award was 
given, by Shri Divatia, in November 1947. In September 1953 the union terminated this award 
and submitted fresh demands. The dispute was referred to adjudication, and there was an award 
by Shri S.H.Naik in 1955. In October 1958 the union gave a notice terminating the Naik Award 
and made demands which were again adjudicated, in December 1959. Thus thirteen years passed 
without a single bilateral agreement. British Oxygen mounted similar resistance to a culture of 
bilateralism. In a case adjudicated in 1962, the union complained that „the existing scales of pay 
of the various categories have not been raised since [the Merchant Award of 1949]‟. In an even 
more extreme case, Greaves Cotton, the first negotiated settlement on general demands took 
place in 1974, twenty-eight years after the union was formed! Here, again, service conditions 
were regulated by a series of awards. A final example: although Firestone workers were 
unionised in 1948, the first bilateral agreement was not made till 1969. In all this, the tenacity of 
the unions is even more remarkable. The whole culture of collective bargaining was forced on 
companies by the employees‟ unions and, of course, other sections of the union movement 
through the machinery of litigation. This was possible because the employees‟ unions had a 
position of considerable strength in the early period, and because Industrial Relations strategy 
was premised on the first of the models outlined earlier. Many large companies encouraged 
internal unions as long as it was feasible to control the rate of pay increases through litigation. 
With the oil price hikes  
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of the 1970s and the more rapid tempo of inflation, managements began to lose control on pay 
determination. The precarious truce of the fifties and sixties began to crumble rapidly in the 
seventies. 
  
  
Transitions 
One dispute more than any other foreshadowed the major trends which dominated the new 
period of industrial relations from the seventies on. Computerisation had gathered speed in 
Bombay office establishments by the late sixties. In 1973, at their federation conference at Patna, 
the various Voltas unions, it was said to us, decided to impose restrictions on the company‟s 
computerisation programme. In swift response, on 12 February the company declared a lock-out 
at the Ballard Estate offices which lasted 4½ months. This was probably the longest lock-out 
inflicted on a union till that time in Bombay. The EDP settlement concluded with the federation 
following this dispute started wi th  an assurance, to the employees, „through the Federation and 
its affiliated Unions, that as a direct or indirect result of the use or extension of EDP in the 
Company: a) there will be no retrenchment, redundancy, or reduction of employment in any 
Division/ Department/ Establishment of the Company, and the remuneration of the employees 
will be protected. The future prospects of employees will not be adversely affected…‟ Moreover, 
detailed Appendices listed current and future EDP applications. In 1975, however, with the 
country under Emergency, the company declared unilaterally that it was terminating the EDP 
settlement. Management‟s stand was. „We are not bound by your restrictions‟, and with the 
union filing a writ petition under Unfair Labour Practice, the Labour Commissioner averred that 
once computerisation had been agreed, the union could not impose restrictions. The significance 
of this dispute is that it illustrates some of the essential features of the new industrial relations 
culture which gradually reversed the balance of power against the unions in the late seventies, 
and especially in the eighties. In the first place, the company wanted the freedom to reorganise 
work without restrictions from the union. Secondly, it resorted to a prolonged lock-out to enforce 
this freedom. And finally, even after it was forced to settle the issue with the union, it had no 
compunction about violating the agreement. 
Management demands became a major part of the new period of collective bargaining, with 
companies determined to secure flexibility and impose controls on pay. The employees‟ unions 
were often a particularly powerful source of resistance to this new struggle for unrestricted 
freedoms. Settlements continued to be signed with some regularity up to around 1987. 
Litigation was now used by employers to codify and lend legality to a set of management 
objectives which were not easily secured through collective bargaining. But insofar as the 
Courts upheld the union‟s stand, companies were now increasingly unabashed about flouting 
Court orders. Hindustan Lever took advantage of the Emergency to revoke a 1957 agreement 
conceding the status of “workmen” to its All-India field force employees. Five days after the 
Emergency was declared, the company unilaterally repudiated the 1957 agreement. The dispute 
reached the Supreme Court in 1982, and two years later the Court held that the company was 
bound by the 1957 agreement. Till today, however, management has done nothing to rescind the 
adverse changes made in 1975. Other companies took advantage of the Emergency to impose 
ceilings on D.A. (Hoechst, German Remedies) or cut rates of dearness allowance (Pfizer). 
The seventies were a watershed in another way. The new rigidity of managements would not 
have succeeded without deeper changes in the labour market. The seventies represented the last 
significant wave of recruitment in Bombay companies. On the one
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hand, recruitment was a key factor in the molecular expansion of the Shiv Sena,  on the other, the 
larger companies began to see a general contraction of employment, particularly after 1980. In 
the early eighties we were told by sources within the company, „Resentment against South Indian 
recruitment kept the BKS in Larsen & Toubro‟. The Sena‟s expansion is evident in the fact that a 
Sena group took over the leadership of the Pfizer Employees‟ Union in 1971, for a short period. 
On the whole, however, the Sena made little impact on the unions in this period, and the strategy 
was clearly one of consolidating „from within‟. Without such a process of consolidation, 
disproportionate to its actual hold over unions, it is impossible to see how the Ciba lock-out 
settlement of 1981 could have been reached through the mediation of Bal Thackeray in the Sena 
office. By the mid-eighties a member of the managing committee estimated that one out of every 
two workers in Ciba-Geigy was an „active supporter of the Sena‟. Yet the Ciba union had always 
been with G.R.Khanolkar once the short-lived Ciba Packers‟ Union was given up. 
The late seventies saw a huge upsurge of strike activity,  with the employees‟ unions playing a 
major role. Union affiliations became less stable, and it is possible that young workers were a 
major source of volatility.  But the same generation of workers could renovate the tradition of 
employees‟ unionism and even radicalise its perspectives. This happened in Hindustan Lever 
where young workers took control of the union and created a unionism of “direct action” in the 
early eighties. On management‟s description, „the modus operandi of the employees is to resort 
to illegal strike, categorywise, in different sections of the establishment on different days and 
thereby paralyse the functioning of (other) sections/departments‟. These forms of action would 
become progressively less viable in the years that followed, partly because companies acquired a 
new flexibility in the eighties through the relocation of investments into geographically 
dispersed manufacturing networks deployed for parallel production, and in part because their 
managements displayed a new ruthlessness in this period. Many companies launched an 
offensive to undermine the internal unions through a combination of frontal assault and a „war of 
attrition‟. Already by the end of 1984, one internal leader confessed, „ Internal  unions are 
under a lot of pressure physically. They can “crack”‟. 
Management offensive 
In Abbott Laboratories, the company played on the division between contract workers and 
permanent employees, telling the former, „We want to make all of you permanent but the 
employees‟ union is coming in the way‟. Indeed, it is said that the company's advocate invited 
Samant to organise them with promises of permanency. In Pfizer, the Mazdoor Congress made 
its entry in 1975 with the support of a Sena group which had earlier bid for control of the union 
and then collapsed on charges of embezzlement of union funds. This division, facilitated by 
management, was used to break the union‟s resistance to automation. Promotions were used to 
favour the Mazdoor Congress and redundancies concentrated among supporters of the 
employees‟ union: „Our people became a floating staff‟. In Philips in the mid eighties, the 
company instigated a split in the Philips Workers Union and encouraged supervisors to join a 
management-sponsored staff union called the Peico Employees‟ Union. While the Workers 
Union faced over 100 chargesheets, 18 suspensions, and 15 dismissals, the company proceeded 
to sign an agreement with the union it had promoted. All this was possible because the Philips 
federation had been legally dismembered by 1986. In Otis, where the Sthaniya Lokadhikar 
Samiti disrupted the bonus agitation launched by the federation early in 1992, management 
encouraged the entry of the BKS. On 2 June 1992, forty Shiv Sainiks came into the factory to 
mobilise signatures for the BKS, and by July the company had started negotiating with this 
union. Fortunately, the employees‟ union retained a solid base among the field staff responsible
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for the erection and servicing of lifts. 
 
The general feature common to all these situations is the drive to undermine a strong internal   
union by a calculated use of divisiveness. At any rate, the eighties became yet 
another watershed, inaugurating a new and more aggressive style of management. The most 
dramatic expression of this was the massively increased use of lock-outs by companies. In a 
sample of 138 companies with manufacturing investments in Maharashtra (50 foreign and 88 
Indian-controlled), and isolating disputes with a minimum duration of 30 days, the proportion of 
all disputes accounted for by lockouts increases as follows: 0% in 1956–64, 13% in 1965–69, 
35% in 1970–74, 30% in 1975–79, 42% in 1980–84, 45% in 1985–89, and 56% in 1990–93. In 
absolute terms, the number of lockouts affecting establishments of the sample companies rises 
from 3 in 1965–69 to 12 in 1970–74, to 21 in 1975–79, to 54 in 1980–84, then falls to 25 in 
1985–89, and to 14 in 1990–93. Thus the eighties are clearly the high-water mark of employer 
aggressiveness, with a greater frequency of lockouts than in any other period. To repeat, these 
figures refer to disputes lasting at least a month, that is, to the more protracted and bitterly fought 
struggles. Secondly, if we look at the distribution of lockouts by type of union, contrasting 
employees‟ unions and external unions, it turns out that employees’ unions faced a higher 
incidence of lockouts. For example, in the eighties 49% of all disputes in which an employee‟s 
union was involved were lockouts – against 38% for the external unions. By the early nineties, 
when the volume of conflict declined sharply and the sample numbers are much smaller, of 7 
disputes involving employees‟ unions, 5 were lock-outs (71%, against 43% for the outside 
unions). In short, the idea that internal unions were preferred by Bombay managements or were 
more compliant with managerial goals is simply untenable and the opposite of the truth. 
 
Thus a whole series of employees‟ unions were affected by bitter and protracted lockouts in the 
eighties. In Sewri, the Tata Oil Mills & Allied Companies‟ Employees‟ Union went from a 141-
day strike in 1979 to a 49-day lock-out in 1980. (Four days before the strike was called off, the 
company had entered into a secret agreement with the BKS, securing agreement to discuss a 
ceiling on dearness allowance within six months of this deal.) Just across the road from Tomco, 
the Firestone Tyre Employees‟ Union faced a 73-day lock-out in July 1981. The BPCL 
(Refineries) Employees‟ Union and the Process Operators & Laboratory Analysts‟ Union at the 
refinery in Trombay were locked out for 153 days in 1982, Blue Star Workers‟ Union for 10 
months in 1984, Abbott Laboratories Employees‟ Union for 13 months in 1987, Hindustan Lever 
Employees‟ Union for precisely a year in June 1988. In May 1994, Otis declared a partial lock-
out against its field staff, which lasted for well over 7 months. In each case, the target of 
company hostility was a relatively strong and sometimes extremely well-organised internal 
union. Throughout Bombay industry the 1980s were a period when companies went on a 
rampage against strong unions. 
 
There is a widespread perception among employees‟ unions‟ leaders that the eighties ushered in 
a more aggressive management style. In many companies this meant an actual change in 
management or the appointment of a senior executive who was decidedly hostile to the union. 
The Blue Star lock-out was declared the very day the founder‟s son, Ashok Advani, took over as 
Chairman. In Philips, D. N. Ghosh was brought in from ICI in 1982 to break the militancy of the 
federation, and conflict ran high throughout the eighties till a conscious effort was made to 
improve the situation with the appointment of Matthias. One expression of management‟s 
obduracy was the refusal to implement an agreement on the weekly-off. In Ciba-Geigy, some ten 
years before its closure, the
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Company Secretary M. R. Lall was isolated for special blame as the dominant source of hostility 
to the union. Lall was responsible for a lock-out of over 9 months in 1980–81 and accused of 
„wanting to finish the union‟. In Otis, the appointment of R.R.Bajaj as Managing Director began 
a period of rapidly escalating conflict in the early nineties, with the company relying on the Sena 
to break the hold of the employees‟ union. The agreement reached with the BKS in November 
1993 was overwhelmingly rejected by the workers. In Herdillia, controlled by G. P. Goenka, the 
„hard line on the union‟ was due to P. P. Roy, Vice-President (Personnel), who sparked off a 42-
day strike in July1995 when the General Body rejected the company‟s counter-demands and 
Roy began harassing and intimidating workers. „Beggars can't be choosers‟, he is supposed to 
have said. In BPCL, the government‟s titanic struggle over dearness allowance produced a war 
of attrition which spread demoralisation through large parts of the company. The whole drive to 
beat the unions into submission on the issue of DA simply undermined the „culture and 
discipline which was there in the Shell days‟. „Because people have suffered a lot, this has 
spread demoralisation.‟ Thus throughout the eighties unions faced fierce resistance and the 
employees‟ unions were the targets of considerable hostility. 
 
The eighties were also a period when companies began to run down their workforces. At this 
stage, this was achieved less by Voluntary Retirement Schemes than by natural wastage and the 
non-filling of vacancies, but it meant that the union category was progressively dwindling. 
Pharmaceutical factories in particular saw a considerable loss of employment, with a 
disproportionate impact on the employees‟ unions, since they were strongly represented in this 
sector. Knowing that Medical Reps were still an expanding group, pharmaceutical managements 
made their non-bargainability a leading battle-cry. Fierce struggles began to be fought to break 
the hold of the employees‟ unions over the Medical Representatives. As competition increased 
within the industry, it was crucial for companies to have control over the work schedules and 
workloads of their field staff. To remove MRs from the union, companies took the stand that 
they are not „workmen‟ under the Industrial Disputes Act. The OPPI co-ordinated industrial 
relations strategy for the industry. In the mid seventies they took a conscious decision to split the 
unions in the industry by tackling each company separately. „They decided to weaken them at 
unit level.‟ There was also a widespread conversion of the higher bargainable grades into non-
bargainable categories, with the conversion of field employees into „Executives‟, Medical 
Representatives into „Franchise Representatives‟, „Sales Executives‟, and „Health Care 
Executives‟, stenographers into „Secretaries‟ or „Confidential Secretaries‟. Erosion of the 
bargaining unit was also reinforced by widespread and extensive subcontracting. By the late 
eighties and early nineties, companies were routinely contracting out between forty and seventy 
per cent of their production or turnover. In Sandoz, by late 1995, 80–85% of turnover was from 
„third parties‟. 
 
Thus the impact of VRS has to be set in the context of a co-ordinated attack which involved 
interlocking strategies, all centred on the progressive and systematic erosion of the bargaining 
unit. The ability of companies to subcontract was the single most powerful weapon in this 
arsenal of strategies. It is clear that Bombay managements had finally decided to deunionise 
labour and to press for deunionisation even at the cost of large-scale destruction of jobs and 
closure of factories. 
 
 
A new employees’ unionism 
 
Since the late eighties and especially after 1991, Voluntary Retirement Schemes have been 
depleting whole factories and offices, and unions have had to struggle for survival. This is 
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particularly true of the employees‟ unions, which actually tend to disappear with the 
establishments they are linked to. One union in a large pharmaceutical plant described the 
concessions it was willing to make (in 1993) as „gambling to survive‟. Liberalisation has added 
considerable impetus to the employers‟ offensive but is clearly not the cause of it. The most 
general lesson that emerges from the experience of the employees‟ unions is that in isolation and 
without a culture of legal rights that gives workers more control over the decisions which 
corporate managements make, even the strongest unions can be destroyed. By way of response, 
therefore, the most far-sighted employees‟ unions have concentrated increasingly on extending 
their organisation to the new plants elsewhere in the country and building up strong federations. 
Companies have generally reacted to employees‟ federations wi th  abhorrence, but the example 
of Ingersoll-Rand shows that not all  companies are inflexibly opposed to dealing with unions on 
this basis. (The Federation of Ingersoll-Rand (India) Employees was formed as recently as 
1992.) The perspectives of this new period of employees‟ unions are thus clear in a general way. 
As expressions of a relatively advanced union culture which emphasises self-governance in the 
running of unions, professionalism, and the need for a thorough knowledge of the company, the 
employees‟ unions are ideally placed to pursue both of the objectives mentioned above. The 
issues of management accountability and recognition for Federations are potentially a powerful 
basis on which the employees‟ unions, traditionally fragmented and bereft of control over 
company decisions, can reconstruct their bargaining position. 
 
       Rohini Hensman & Jairus Banaji 
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Name of union Date of formation 
Lever Bros Employees' Union by 1941 (?) 
Lever Mazdoor Sabha by  1941 (?) 
Tata Oil Mills Employees' Union 1946 
Imperial Chemical Industries Employees' U. 1946 
Greaves Cotton and Allied Cos' Employees' 
U. 
1946 
Ford Motors Staff Union 1946 
Goodlass Wall & Elephant Oil Mills  E.U. 1946 
Volkart Employees' Union 1947 
Indian Oxygen & Acetylene Co. Ltd.'s E.U. 1948 
East Asiatic and Allied Cos' Employees' 
Union 
1948 
Firestone Rubber Workers' Union 1948 
Firestone Tire Employees' Union by 1949 
Burmah-Shell Employees' Union by 1949 
Glaxo Laboratories Employees' Union 1950 
Larsen & Toubro Ltd and Allied Cos' Staff 
U. 
by 1950 
National Employees' Union (= Kamani E.U.) 1951,1955 
Ciba Packers' Union 1954 
Parke-Davis Employees' Union 1955 
May &. Baker Employees' Union by 1961 
Roche Employees' Union 1961 
Burroughs Wellcome Staff & Workers' Union 1961 
Siemens Engineering & Mfg Employees' 
Union 
1961 
Pfizer Employees' Union 1962 
Philips Employees' Union 1962 
Otis Elevator Employees' Union 1962 
Hoechst Employees' Union 1963 
BSR Process Operators' & Lab Analysts' 
Union 
by 1963 
Siemens Workers' Union 1964 
Wyeth Employees' Union 1964 
Merck Sharp & Dohme Employees' Union 1965 
Phi lips  Workers' Union 1968 
Union Carbide (India Ltd) Employees' Union 1968 
German Remedies Employees' Union 1968 
Nocil Employees' Union c.1969 
Abbott Laboratories Employees' Union c.1969 
Polyolefins India  Ltd Employees' Union 1971 
National Rayon Corporation Employees' 
Union 
1971 
Blue Star Workers' Union 1971 
Nicholas Employees' Union 1973 
Mindia Employees' Union 1978 
BPCL (Refineries) Employees' Union c.1979 
 
